of generalization in categorization cannot predict the large variation between participants. This individual variation in performance suggests that there may be no single law governing human generalization, and therefore, that performance may not fit into shepard's theoretical analysis, although it is too early to draw firm conclusions on this issue.
The second project arises from the apparent gap between theoretical analysis and empirical data in shepard's program concerns connecting data to theory. shepard has provided a strong evidence that confusability is an inverse exponential function of distance in an internal multidimensional space. How can this result be explained theoretically? The rest of this commentary develops a possible approach.
To begin with, we note that the view of psychological distance as Euclidean distance in an internal multidimensional space may be too restrictive to be applicable to many aspects of cognition. It is typically assumed that the cognitive representation formed of a visually presented object, a sentence or a story, will involve structured representations. Structured representations can describe an object not just as a set of features, or as a set of numerical values along various dimensions, but in terms of parts and their interrelations, and properties that attach to those parts. For example, in describing a bird, it is important to specify not just the presence of a beak, eyes, claws, and feathers, but the way in which they are spatially and functionally related to each other. Equally, it is important to be able to specify that the beak is yellow, the claws orange, and the feathers white -to tie attributes to specific parts of an object. Thus, describing a bird, a line of Shakespeare, or the plot of Hamlet as a point in a Euclidean multidimensional space appears to require using too weak a system of representation. This line of argument raises the possibility that the Universal Law may be restricted in scope to stimuli which are sufficiently simple to have a simple multidimensional representation -perhaps those that have no psychologically salient part-whole structure. We shall argue, however, that the Universal Law is applicable quite generally, since all these aspects are taken into account by the algorithmic information theory approach. This leads to a more generalized form of the Universal Law.
In particular, we measure the distance between arbitrary representations (whether representations of points in space, of scripts, sentences, or whatever), by the complexity of the process of "distorting" each representation to the other. Specifically, the distance between two representations, A and B, is defined to be the sum of the lengths of the shortest computer program that maps from A to B and the length of the shortest computer program that maps from B to A. This is known as sum-distance (Li & Vitányi 1997) . Sum-distance measure is attractive not only because it has some theoretical and empirical support as a measure of similarity (Chater & Hahn 1997; Hahn et al., submitted) , but also because it connects with the theoretical notion of information distance, developed in the mathematical theory of Kolmogorov complexity (Li & Vitányi 1997) . (See Chater 1999, for an informal introduction in the context of psychology.) The intuition behind this definition is that similar representations can be "distorted" into each other by simple processes, whereas highly dissimilar representations can only be distorted into each other by complex processes; the complexity of a process is then measured in terms of the shortest computer program that codes for that process.
shepard uses a specific function, G(A, B), as a measure of the confusability between two items. It turns out that -using only the assumption that the mapping between the input stimuli and the identification responses is computable -it can be shown that G(A, B) is proportional to the negative exponential of the sumdistance between A and B. That is, if distance is measured in terms of the complexity of the mapping between the representations A and B, then shepard's universal law, when applied to confusability, follows automatically (Chater & Vitányi, submitted).
We have suggested that this result is attractive, because it applies in such a general setting -it does not presuppose that items correspond to points in an internal multidimensional psychological space. This observation suggests a further line of empirical research: to determine whether the Universal Law does indeed hold in these more general circumstances.
Abstract: Shepard's exponential law provides a functional explanation of generalization. The account complements the more common mechanistic models. The elegant and powerful analyses answer one of Tinbergen's (1963) four whys of behavior: a benefit conferred on the animal by generalizing in this way. A complete account might address evolutionary and developmental questions in addition to mechanistic and functional ones.
[shepard]
In the classic paper "On aims and methods in Ethology," Tinbergen (1963) identified four types of "why" questions to be addressed about any behavior. Mechanistic explanations concern the immediate conditions for a behavior, from stimulus conditions to brain structures. Developmental questions ask about the ontogenetic history of a behavior. The field of psychology addresses mostly these proximate questions of mechanism and development, with more on mechanism than on development. Far less frequently tackled are the ultimate questions of function (what Tinbergen called "survival value") and evolution. Functional questions address the benefits conferred, at present, by a behavior, while evolutionary questions address the evolutionary history of a behavior. To fully understand a phenomenon in learning, perception, or cognition, answers to all four whys are needed.
shepard's article reprinted here takes the road less travelled and answers functional questions about learning, cognition, and perception. The aim is to look for abstract universal principles that animals "should" honor because the world they live in possesses certain invariant properties. To put it bluntly, behaving in accord with these invariants should add survival value. The invariants are abstract and deep, and digging them out is hard work to my mind. The functional universals thus unearthed add a whole new dimension to understanding the phenomena, a dimension often missing in psychology.
In the rest of my commentary, I will limit consideration to the topic of generalization, the topic with which I am most familiar. Mechanistically, various models of spreading activation, going back to Shepard (1958) , can produce generalization gradients (e.g., Cheng et al. 1997; Reid & Staddon 1998) . Others take a network approach (e.g., Ghirlanda & Enquist 1998; 1999; Gluck 1991; Saksida 1999) . Choosing amongst them remains difficult, but we have plenty of recent thinking on the topic.
On the functional question, shepard's is the only account of generalization to date. It offers far more than speculation about the possible advantages of generalizing. The analysis tackles the form of gradients. It is shepard's style not to contrast how animals might differ in generalization, but to find universals. In the face of seeming diversity, shepard tells us where and how to look for universality. The functional analysis came up with elegant reasons why animals should follow the exponential law, and the conditions and idealizations required for finding it. It is thus powerful in offering not only reasons for generalizing, but some deep insights into the way it should happen. The law has found supporting evidence in humans and pigeons (Shepard 1987b) , and recently in honeybees (Cheng 2000) .
The exponential law gives us a universal for generalization, and tells us why it benefits animals today. We may further ask how animals evolved to generalize in this way. Given that the law is found in diverse animals, convergent evolution is suggested. But it is hard to add much. The evolutionary question is difficult to answer for the lack of behavioral records. Generalization gradients are not imprinted on rocks. An answer will likely require a far broader and deeper comparative study of learning.
How do animals "come up with" shepard's law in the course of their lives? One possibility is that y ϭ e Ϫkx is wired in the brain.
To be more precise, the exponential law might be mostly a matter of maturation. The worker bee hatching out of her cell immediately starts generalizing in accord with shepard's law, in each and every task that she undertakes in her life. Thus, the initial state for generalization is an exponential gradient. Experience fills in the scaling parameter left free in the equation (k). But the initial state might be a broader class of functions, and experience might be necessary to narrow the gradients down to the exponential shape. Evolution does not have to wire in the equation, so to speak. It just has to ensure that the animal would arrive at the equation in the course of a typical life. As an example, consider the migration of the indigo bunting in its first autumn of life. The bunting is known to fly south by using stars at night. It has to know which way is south by the pattern of the night sky in the northern hemisphere. Is a map of stars etched into the brains of indigo buntings to guide them south? Classic work by Emlen (1975) shows that this is not so. Using a planetarium to manipulate night sky conditions, Emlen showed that some exposure to the night sky before the time of migration is necessary for oriented navigation. It turns out that the birds, from viewing the night sky, extract the fixed point of rotation of the stars, and fly in a direction opposite to that. Data on the issue of the development of generalization are lacking. The topic is perhaps best examined in an insect forager such as the worker honeybee, whose life cycle is short, whose learning is quick, and whose experiences can be controlled to a great extent.
In sum, I very much welcome shepard's functional approach to cognition. In addition to mechanistic questions, all cognitive science, comparative cognition included, should take aboard functional questions into research. We should also address developmental and evolutionary questions.
Which colour space(s) is Shepard talking about?
Lieven Decock and Jaap van Brakel Department of Philosophy, University of Leuven, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. {Lieven.Decock; Jaap.vanBrakel}@hiw.kuleuven.ac.be Abstract: Contra Shepard we argue, first, that his presentation of a threedimensional representational (psychological or phenomenal) colour space is at odds with many results in colour science, and, second, that there is insufficient evidence for Shepard's stronger claim that the three-dimensionality of colour perception has resulted from natural selection, moulded by the particulars of the solar spectrum and its variations.
According to shepard the colour appearances of surfaces correspond to relatively fixed points in a three-dimensional colour space (his emphasis). However, the distinction between phenomenal, perceptual, psychological, or internalised representational colour spaces and the various technological or (psycho)physical colour spaces is blurred. He takes as self-evident that these colour spaces are isomorphic. Examples of psychophysical colour spaces are the CIE chromaticity diagram, a wavelength mixture space (Clark 1993, p. 37) , and a retinex colour space (Land 1986, p. 12) . Such colour spaces are characterised by means of a limited number of parameters that can be computed on the basis of precise measurements by means of spectrometers and underlying physical theory. shepard's internalised representational colour space, based on the traditional account of a perceptual colour space, is not likely to be one of these "physical" spaces. Furthermore shepard's representational space-time space may have been constructed on analogy with the internal colour space. Here, however, we will focus on the three dimensionality of his colour space.
First, it is by no means clear how to give a good operational characterisation of the three dimensions of shepard's representational colour space in terms of lightness, hue, and saturation. The difficulty is very apparent in the ubiquitous ambiguity surrounding a lightness-or brightness-axis. The lightness-axis is, primarily, a black-white axis, based on contrast experiences; the brightness axis is based primarily on the luminosity of colour patches. Problems arise with the psychological difference between black/white, dark/light, and dull/bright. Furthermore, there are interdependencies between hue, brightness, and saturation, however defined, and the three of them fail to cover all aspects of "colour" appearance (for references see Saunders & van Brakel 1997, p. 175f ) .
Second, it is not obvious how to characterise the dimensions of the representational colour space unambiguously. Traditionally, there are three dimensions, but this rests on rather vague introspective intuitions. Multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) techniques allow the ordering of colour comparisons in a spatial structure. However, these techniques yield a variety of results and are difficult to interpret. Moreover, how to choose samples that do not prejudge the outcome? Further, even if MDS techniques yield three dimensions, there is nothing to tell you how to define the axes and measure distances. Finally, it has been claimed that four, six, or seven dimensions are needed to adequately represent human colour vision (Chang & Carroll 1980; Sokolov 1997) .
Third, shepard presents the colour space as "approximating the idealised spherical solid." Although his characterisation is hedged, it still suppresses the many proposed "forms" of colour space. It has been presented as an infinite cylinder -the hue-saturation circle remaining but the brightness (dark-dazzling) axis being infinite (Thompson 1995, p. 47) . It can also be presented as a cylinder with a finite lightness-or brightness-axis. Sivik' s Natural Colour System is based on a double cone (Sivik 1997). All these are "neat" geometrical shapes. Moreover, empirical evidence pulls in the direction of less well-behaved spaces. The well-known Munsell colour space has a bulge in the purple area. There has been talk of "a Riemannian space with global cylindrical co-ordinates" or "a power
